Speciesist Language

The manipulation of language in support of speciesist attitudes

James O’Heare

Most people experience empathy and demonstrate compassion for those (humans) who suffer, but most people also believe it is morally acceptable to cause nonhuman animals to suffer and die by the billions each year for (unnecessary) human purposes. Most humans have vested interests in maintaining this discrepancy. Deceptive rhetorical devices reflect and maintain this belief system. Euphemism, false definition and semantic reversal obfuscate the disconnect and hence recognition of a need to resolve it. I will analyze this manipulation of language, examining the motivation for it, effects it has on belief systems and offering examples of such prevarication. I argue that speciesist rhetorical devices are deep-seated and pervasive in the English language and that they tend to allow for deception, which allows people to speciously justify or avoid consideration of the suffering and death they cause.

Cavalieri (2001, p. 70) defines speciesism simply as a term “used to describe any form of discrimination based on species.” Others (Singer, 1975; Regan, 1983; Dunayer, 2004; Soanes, & Stevenson, 2005) claim that speciesism involves preferred consideration for humans but there are circumstances where other “preferred” species are included and so these definitions are not satisfactory. I will define speciesism as any form of unjust discrimination based solely on species membership. In recent years, we have come to appreciate that unjust discrimination is morally objectionable. Just as most people now consider racism and sexism morally repugnant, so too should we consider speciesism morally repugnant, as they each involve the same fundamental unjust discrimination. 

In the most prominent (though controversial) work to date on the topic of speciesism and language, Dunayer (2001) addressed the motivation for and effect of such practices. 

“How do we justify our treatment of nonhumans? We lie—to ourselves and to each other, about our species and about others. Deceptive language perpetuates speciesism, …. Like sexism and racism, speciesism is a form of self-aggrandizing prejudice. Bigotry requires self-deception. … Words have political effect. They can foster oppression or liberation, prejudice or respect. … Speciesist language denigrates or discounts nonhumans; it legitimizes their abuse.” 

Dunayer (2001) argues that deceptive language is a primary means of maintaining speciesism. Mills (2001) points out “few in the antidiscriminatory language arena would assume that language plays such a major role and that such language always involves conscious deception and falsification.” More broadly acceptable is that deceptive rhetorical devices contribute to maintaining speciesist attitudes just as, and to the extent that, sexist and racist language contributes to the maintenance of sexist and racist attitudes; it allows us to avoid and deny the speciesist disconnect and hence the moral responsibility to address it.

Perhaps the most fundamental example of speciesist language is a false distinction between human animals and nonhuman animals as humans and animals, as if humans were not animals. Another common example is the differential use of the relative pronoun “who” versus “which” and “that.” Similarly, the use of “it” rather than “he,” or “she” achieved the same goal. Using the words “that,” “which” and “it” rather than “who,” “he” and “she” subtly reduces all nonhuman animals to things rather than sentient beings and conceals their individuality; it encourages us to see them as mere tools for our use. Gilquin and Jacobs (2006) found that some official language sources allow “who” for nonhuman animals while many do not; newspaper style guides generally allow “who” whereas publication manuals do not. It is also common practice to put quotation marks around nonhuman animal personal names in the few instances that people use personal names for nonhuman animals. People use quotation marks for any other word that refers to an individual nonhuman animal’s thoughts or feelings even though a preponderance of the scientific literature suggest nonhuman sentient animals have rich and complex mental experiences and it is therefore, not seriously in question. 

Distinct lexicons for humans and nonhumans, and sterile or “nonanthropomorphic” language help to maintain an “us and them” attitude. Humans have “personality” whereas nonhuman animals have “temperament.” “Motherly love” in humans is “maternal instinct” in nonhumans. Humans experience “making love” while nonhumans “mate.” Humans “love” while nonhumans “bond.” Humans have “friendships” while nonhumans perform “affiliative behaviors.” When humans act with “unfeeling cruelty” we refer to them as “brutish” or as “animals,” implying this is a nonhuman animal attribute when in fact, humans are the gratuitously violent species. Compassion is referred to as “human kindness” to imply kindness is a characteristic specific to humans (Dunayer, 2001). 

Hunters refer to what they do as a “sport” concealing its violence. Hunters argue that the sentient being rights advocate’s use of the term “murder” is moralistic and emotion-laden although making killing moralistic may be arguably appropriate given that this “sport” involves killing sentient beings. On the other hand, “murder” is a legal term, and applies, at least at present and in North America, only to humans; the term kill is clearer. Hunters use the terms “wildlife refuge” and “wildlife preserve” not to describe a "refuge" that "preserves" lives but rather as controlled hunting grounds that preserves a stable number of animals to kill. Hunters refer to “harvesting” nonhuman animals as if they were crops. Hunters call themselves “sportsmen” or “outdoorsmen” rather than killers, which is actually a more accurate description, albeit “moralistic.” (Dunayer, 2001)

Zoo staff refer to cages as “habitats” or “homes,” and captive individuals as “residents,” “ambassadors for their species,” “exhibits” or “specimen.” They use museum terminology (such as referring to captives as a “collection”) to support the attitude that they are things or a group rather than individual sentient beings. Zoos now prefer the term “wildlife center,” prefer “holding” or “keeping” instead of imprison, and captors are referred to as “keepers” or “caretakers.” Violent subjugation is called “training,” and they market themselves as “educational” or “conservation” centers, when in fact visitors are not educated and individuals are not conserved; certainly their dignity and rights are not conserved. Zoos also attempt to justify imprisoning their captives on the grounds that they do research but most of the “research” is on how to keep these individuals captive, a problem that would not require research if they did not trap and “keep” them to begin with (Dunayer, 2001).

Rather than capture, “aquariums” prefer to say they “collect” or “acquire” the “specimens” or “residents.” Just as in zoos, “aquariums” go to great lengths to “educate” their staff on avoiding all unequivocal terminology and replace them with euphemisms and semantic reversals. They avoid the word entertainment now and instead staff are directed to use the word ‘educational;” they are not performances any more but rather “demonstrations.” (Dunayer, 2001)

Researchers cast sentient being rights advocates as “anti-science” and portray their own position as “pro-science.” This is a false distinction since sentient being rights advocates are pro-science but opposed to the harmful use of animals in the name of science just as pro-science psychologists get by just fine while recognizing they cannot do just anything they can dream up with human children. Researchers claim that the research carried out on nonhuman animals causes “minor discomfort” when in fact death, deprivation and extreme pain are common. Animals are “fasted” on a “restricted diet” rather than starved and “thermally injured” rather than scalded. Animals left alive after experiments are “sacrificed” or “put to sleep” rather than killed. Rather than disfigured, animals are “modified.” (Dunayer, 2001)

Painful farming practices such as debeaking, toe nail removal, dehorning and castration are all carried out without anesthetic while farmers call these “mildly discomforting,” an extreme understatement. Farmers call slaughterhouses “meat factories” as if they manufacture the muscle and flesh as they would a clock radio; they “process” rather than kill the animals. One spokesperson for the fishing industry advises calling fish slaughter “harvesting” in order to keep the public “happy.” (Dunayer, 2001)

Many industries and individuals have vested interests in maintaining the attitude that animals are not deserving of moral consideration and the disconnect between self-evaluated human compassion on the one hand and the causing of widespread suffering and death to nonhuman animals on the other hand creates the conditions for deception. Deception by obfuscation and prevarication is achieved through various deceptive rhetorical devices that are pervasive throughout English speaking society. Each major nonhuman animal use industry utilizes their own application of this practice but each share the common feature of encouraging us to think of nonhuman animals as things for our use rather than as sentient individual beings deserving of moral consideration. I anticipate the retort that sentient being rights advocates also obfuscate with language to further their “radical” or "extreme" agendas. In some cases, this is true although it pales in comparison to the entrenched prevarication used by the rest of society and the distinction that one side argues for protecting from suffering while the other side causes the suffering. Language is a weapon in the war waged by people, institutions and society against facing this reality. 
                                                                                                                                                         

References

Blackwell, S. (2002). Linguists and other animals. Journal of Sociolinguistics, 6(4), 589-597.
Cavalieri, P. (2004). The Animal Question: Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human Rights. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dunayer, J. (2001). Animal Equality Language and Liberation. Derwood: Ryce Publishing.
Dunayer, J. (2004). Speciesism. Derwood: Ryce Publishing.
Gilquin, G., & Jacobs, G. M. (2006). Elephants who marry mice are very unusual: The use of the relative pronoun who with nonhuman animals. Society & Animals, 14(1), 79-105.
Mills, S. (2002). Animal equality: Language and liberation (review). Language, 78(3), 581-583.
Regan, T. (1983). The Case for Animal Rights. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Soanes, C., & Stevenson, A. (Eds.). (2005). Oxford Dictionary of English (2nd. Revised ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
 
 

(c) 2010 James O'Heare
(c) 2010 James O'Heare